Major companies liquidate inventory, executives sued; there’s little time left for WeiYi Intelligent Manufacturing.

Source: Yuan Media Exchange

Author | Xie Chunsheng

On the last day of March 2026, WeiYi Intelligent Manufacturing once again submitted its listing application to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, just over half a year after its initial filing.

As a leading enterprise in the field of embodied intelligence robots (EIIR) for industry, WeiYi Intelligent Manufacturing’s development history is not very long. Tianyancha shows that it was founded in 2018, and to date, it has only been 8 years. Looking back at the company’s development trajectory, its early profitable business was AI quality inspection, which had a relatively lower barrier to entry. Its successful transformation into embodied intelligence was not achieved gradually on its own; it was mainly “bought” with money.

From financial data, WeiYi Intelligent Manufacturing has indeed delivered a good report card in recent years. The prospectus shows that thanks to the rapid growth of its embodied intelligent robot business, the company’s revenue jumped from 220.1 million yuan in the early days to 796 million yuan, with a significant increase in gross profit margin.

But behind the shiny financial data, problems that cannot be ignored also lurk.

On one hand, the company’s accounts receivable have surged simultaneously, increasing pressure on capital recovery; on the other hand, early investor Baidu chose to exit completely just as the company was about to go public. This has also sparked market concerns about the company’s future prospects. Additionally, the company’s core executives are involved in litigation disputes, adding some uncertainty to the listing process.

Relying on “buying and acquiring” to become a robot company

WeiYi Intelligent Manufacturing’s expansion history is essentially a history of acquisitions. The two most critical ones are: at the end of 2022 acquiring Zhiyun Tiangong, and in 2025 acquiring Jebote.

At the end of December 2022, WeiYi Intelligent Manufacturing acquired 100% equity of Zhiyun Tiangong, founded by Zhang Zhiqi, at a cost of about 229 million yuan, with part paid in cash and part in shares.

Image source: WeiYi Intelligent Manufacturing Prospectus

Zhang Zhiqi’s background is quite impressive. He was vice president of Baidu’s Intelligent Cloud business group and also served as vice president of Alibaba DingTalk. After the acquisition, Zhang Zhiqi did not leave; he became chairman of the board and CEO of WeiYi Intelligent Manufacturing. Founder Pan Zhengyi stepped back to serve as COO. This was not just a simple purchase of technology or team; it was more like inviting a key figure to be the boss.

This may be related to Pan Zhengyi’s background. His past experience shows that he is rich in financial and management experience but weak in technical expertise. In contrast, Zhang Zhiqi, a graduate of Shanghai University’s automatic control major, has nearly thirty years of experience in the technical industry.

Image source: WeiYi Intelligent Manufacturing Prospectus

The acquisition of Zhiyun Tiangong quickly filled WeiYi’s software and algorithm capability gaps, marking a crucial step in its transformation into embodied industrial intelligence. By 2024, with a 31% market share, it became the leading Chinese supplier of industrial embodied intelligent robots, truly earning the title of “industry leader.”

Image source: WeiYi Intelligent Manufacturing Prospectus

However, this acquisition also brought a significant “burden”—a goodwill of 178 million yuan. Goodwill looks good on the books, but if the acquired assets underperform later, impairment provisions could be made at any time.

More noteworthy are some operations before the acquisition. The prospectus discloses that in 2022, the year of the acquisition, Zhiyun Tiangong was WeiYi’s largest customer. That year, WeiYi sold computing power services to Zhiyun Tiangong for 46.16 million yuan. Meanwhile, during the same period, WeiYi also purchased computing power services from suppliers, spending 62.98 million yuan.

This creates an interesting picture: buying computing power while selling it to the customer—essentially acting as an intermediary.

Image source: WeiYi Intelligent Manufacturing Prospectus

If the acquisition of Zhiyun Tiangong was aimed at enhancing software and algorithm capabilities, then the acquisition of Jebote was to address hardware shortcomings.

Jebote makes the physical body of robots—essentially the “body” of the robot. WeiYi’s transaction with Jebote was carried out in two steps: on June 11, 2025, the company spent 224 million yuan to buy 20.29% of Jebote; a few months later, it bought the remaining 79.71% for a total of 381 million yuan, paid in cash and shares.

After completing the 100% acquisition of Jebote, WeiYi truly embraced the “robot” concept, no longer just an AI company focused on software. It even plans to build a manufacturing base with Jebote in Jiangsu, with an annual output of over 10k robots.

The story makes sense here: integrated hardware and software, covering from perception to execution—this is exactly the most popular embodied intelligence now.

More reliance on external financing to “keep alive”

With new business lines, performance indeed improved.

From 2022 to 2025, WeiYi’s revenue increased from 221 million yuan to 796 million yuan, and net profit shifted from a loss of 92 million yuan to a profit of 5.07 million yuan. The core product EIIR played a significant role in this.

Financial reports show that revenue from EIIR products soared from 33.82 million yuan in 2022 to 453 million yuan in 2025, accounting for 15.3% to 57% of total revenue, becoming the main pillar.

Image source: WeiYi Intelligent Manufacturing Prospectus

But a closer look at the financials reveals that this profitability may not be as solid as it seems.

The most striking issue is accounts receivable. In 2024, WeiYi’s trade receivables and notes receivable totaled 615 million yuan, while revenue that year was only 10k yuan—meaning receivables exceeded revenue. By the first half of 2025, this ratio even exceeded 120%.

This indicates that a significant portion of the goods sold has not been collected. In other words, it’s “paper wealth.” The company explains that rapid business expansion and long customer payment cycles are the reasons, but such high receivables pose a substantial hidden risk.

Even more concerning is operating cash flow. From 2022 to 2024, WeiYi’s operating cash flow was continuously negative, with three consecutive years of net outflow, reaching 154 million yuan in 2024. Only in the first half of 2025 did this gap slightly narrow, but it remained negative.

This creates an awkward situation: the books show profit, but the cash has not actually entered the pocket. To keep operations going, the company can only rely on external financing “blood transfusions.” The prospectus confirms this, showing that in the first half of 2025, financing activities brought in a net inflow of 772 million yuan.

Image source: WeiYi Intelligent Manufacturing Prospectus

Additionally, the company’s revenue dependence on major clients fluctuates greatly. In 2022 and 2023, the top five customers accounted for 59.1% and 52.4% of revenue, respectively; in 2024, this dropped to 28.3%, then rebounded to 38.1% in 2025. Meanwhile, the composition of the top five customers changed frequently: only one customer remained in the top five in 2025, with the other four being new clients.

Founders’ legal issues warrant caution

Compared to financial issues, the movements of shareholders and executives are even more intriguing.

From the financing history, Baidu, through its wholly owned subsidiary Baidu Online, invested in WeiYi early on. It was the company’s early benefactor. In October 2019, Baidu invested in Series A, paying 25.3 million yuan for a 10.34% stake, making it the fourth-largest shareholder at the time. Back then, WeiYi was just a small AI quality inspection company; Baidu’s willingness to invest likely reflected its focus on the technology direction and team.

But by July 2022, Baidu began selling its shares in WeiYi. The first reduction netted 72 million yuan, recovering its cost and making a profit. At that point, WeiYi was already pursuing Zhiyun Tiangong acquisition and was in a business transition. However, Baidu did not sell all its shares and still held 4.34%.

The critical turning point was in May 2025, just a few months before WeiYi’s initial listing application. Baidu completely liquidated its remaining shares, cashing out about 33.8 million yuan.

Altogether, Baidu recovered over 100 million yuan from its investment.

On paper, Baidu made a profit. But the question is: why did it choose to exit just as the company was approaching a high valuation and going public?

One could say this was Baidu’s strategy, especially given its recent setbacks in AI and its normal retreat from non-core businesses and investments. But another intriguing detail is that in the same year Baidu started to significantly reduce its holdings, Zhang Zhiqi, a former associate, took over as the company’s top executive and quickly secured a board seat.

In other words, Baidu stepped back from the board while fully cashing out its shares. An early investor cashing out all its chips right before the company’s IPO—was this “taking profits early,” or “lacking confidence”? The outside world cannot know for sure.

If Baidu’s exit can be seen as “profit-taking,” another matter is more unsettling.

In March 2024, WeiYi’s founder, legal representative, executive director, and COO Pan Zhengyi was sued. The plaintiff was Jiangsu Qizhao Precision Mould Co., Ltd., with the case titled “Dispute over recovering diverted capital.” Simply put, someone secretly withdrew invested funds, causing issues for the company, and the management is being sued to recover the money.

Image source: Tianyancha

What’s more worth examining is that Pan Zhengyi and another defendant, Changzhou Litian Investment Partnership, were the only two major shareholders of the plaintiff company—Pan held 40%, and Changzhou Litian held 60%. This means the plaintiff, which was a shareholder, is now suing its own shareholder. Such “self-suing” usually occurs after the company enters bankruptcy, with the bankruptcy administrator pursuing accountability from shareholders. Tianyancha shows that Jiangsu Qizhao Precision Mould Co., Ltd. was deregistered on May 15, 2025.

Although no further details are disclosed, the involvement of a core executive in a lawsuit over diverted capital is definitely a red flag.

Several questions arise: Were the funds’ inflows and outflows compliant? What role did Pan Zhengyi play? What does this reflect about the company’s governance? We also contacted WeiYi Intelligent Manufacturing for comment, but as of press time, no reply was received.

Today, WeiYi Intelligent Manufacturing stands at a delicate crossroads. The company is crowned as “China’s largest industrial embodied intelligent robot provider,” with about 31% market share, rapid EIIR growth, and high gross margins—its story is compelling. But the capital markets are never short of story-telling companies.

The real challenge is whether the reported profits can turn into real cash in the pocket; whether the EIIR product can grow from a single tree into a forest; and whether those who exited just before the IPO will regret their decision—that’s what WeiYi Intelligent Manufacturing needs to focus on next.

Some images are sourced from the internet. If there are infringements, please notify for removal.

Special statement: The above content solely reflects the author’s personal views or positions and does not represent Sina Finance Headlines’ opinions or positions. If you need to contact Sina Finance Headlines regarding copyright or other issues, please do so within 30 days of the content’s publication.

Massive information and precise analysis, all on Sina Finance APP.